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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE S'T'ATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
-v-
JERRY L. LOCKE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 19067 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, JERRY L. LOCKE, was convicted in a criminal 
proceeding of the offenses of Burglary, a Second Degree Felony, and 
Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor, before the Honorable Scott Daniels, 
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Appellant was convicted in a trial to the bench of 
Burglary, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of §76-6-202, Utah 
1:ode Annotated (1953 as amended), and Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor, 
Ln violation of §76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
He was sentenced to incarceration at the Utah State Prison for the 
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years for the Second Degree 
Felony, and for the term of one year for the Class A Misdemeanor 
The sentences were ordered to run concurrentlv with each other and 
also concurrently with sentences for other convictions the APnel 
lane is presently serving at the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the convictions and the judg· 
ments rendered below, and requests the Court remand the case to the 
trial court for entry of an order not inconsistent with the opinion 
of this Court upon a finding of insufficient evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about December 6, 1981, at 4341 West 5415 South, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Appellant allegedly burglar-
ized the home of Carol L. and Wendell Hibler and stole nroperty 
belonging to them, the value of said prooerty being more than 
$100.00 but less then $250.00 (T.29). The testimony adduced from 
Mrs. Carol L. Hibler was that upon returning to her home at 10:00 
p.m. she noted that it was cold in the interior of the house and 
that a window in a back bedroom was open (T.41). Upon looking out 
the window, Mrs. Hibler and her husband, who has since passed awav, 
saw a stool belonging to them underneath the window (T 39). The 
open window was of the type that could only be ooened by 
a lever from the inside (T.41). There was no evidence of any 
glass having been broken or any portion of the window or accomnan"· 
ing storm screen having been pushed back. 
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Further investigation indicated to the Hiblers that a 
renny bank, (T.44), three one-dollar bills (T.45), and a silver 
necklace (T.45) were missing from the dresser area of the bedroom. 
The value of the necklace was approximately $120.00 (T.48). A 
st1bsequent police investigation consisted of a Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office Deputy coming to the address and dusting for 
fingerprints. Two single latent prints removed from the outside 
pane of the open window by a Salt Lake County Sheriff I.D. Tech-
nician, John Bell, were subsequently compared to and identified 
as being those of the Appellant, Jerry L. Locke (T.107). Over 
defense counsel's objection at trial, Bell testified aa to his con-
clusions that the latent prints were those of the Appellant (T.114-9). 
The testimony of a neighbor, Geri Winkler, was that 
although she passed a male individual walking from the general 
direction of the Hibler residence, she could only say the Aonellant 
"resembled him." (T. 71.) Mrs. Winkler also acknowledged that at 
the Preliminary Hearing she did not identify the Aopellant as the 
individual she passed the evening of December 6, 1981 (T.75). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY ALLOWING THE 
TESTIMONY OF AN EXPERT WHO WAS UNQUALIFIED UNDER 
RULE 702, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, states the following con-
cecning testimony by experts: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence, or to determine a fact in 
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issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise. 
(Emphasis added) 
Application of this rule is, however, by definition not absolute 
It is limited by the restriction that before receiving the con-
clusions or opinions of an "expert," a determination must be made 
as to whether the expert is qualified by knowledge, skill, exoer-
ience, training, or education. 
Appellant contends the expert offered by the State, whose 
testimony provided the only evidence against the Defendant, was un-
qualified by education and experience to render an opinion as to 
the latent fingerprints found. 
Generally, a trial court has wide discretion in passing 
upon the qualification of a witness offered as an expert. People 
v. Chambers, 328 P.2d 236 (Cal. 1958); and, the Utah Supreme Court 
has held that law enforcement officers, if experienced, are compe-
tent to render opinions, State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977), 
However, in those cases where Appellate review by other 
state supreme courts has specifically addressed the question of 
competence of individuals to testify concerning fingerprint evidence 
each court has looked directly at the individual qualifications 
relating to the education, experience, and training of the person 
offered as the expert before determining the correctness of the 
trial court's ruling. 
The relevant question, then, becomes, "What are the mini-
mum standards which must be met by a witness offered as an expert 
in the area of fingerprint analysis before being allowed to testif 1 
II 
and render an opinion? 
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Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff, John Bell, testified 
ro the following experiences, which the State argued qualified 
l1im as an expert in the area of fingerprint identification, and 
therefore, made him a competent witness. He testified that: 
1) He had been, at the time of trial, February 9, 1983, 
in the identification section of the Sheriff's Department for 
one and a half years (T.107); 2) He had graduated from the 
Institute of Applied Science in July, 1980 (T.107); 3) He had 
graduated from a 40-hour advanced FBI latent fingerprint course 
in May, 1982 (T.108); 4) At the time of trial, he had rolled 
approximately five sets of known prints per week and had been 
doing so 18 months prior to his testimony (T.108); 5) At the 
time of Appellant's trial, he had lifted over 1, 100 latent nrints 
(T.110); 6) He is a member of the International Association for 
Identification and receives monthly periodicals (T.110); and 7) At 
the time of trial he compared, per week, approximately 5 latent 
prints against known inked impressions (T.110). 
Yet, before rendering a conclusion concerning print identi-
fication, defense counsel through voir dire questioning and cross 
examination gleaned further information as to the extensiveness 
of the qualifications of the proposed expert: 1) Only 75 Percent 
of the witness' time in the Identification Division is spent in 
the area of fingerprint work (T .114); 2) Fourteen months had 
elapsed between the time the witness completed the correspondence 
course and his being placed in the Identification Division (T.115), 
and that the witness had been an ID Technician only two weeks at the 
-5-
time of the Hibler burglary (T.140); 3) The anolied science 
course consisted of 13 lesson plans completed over a 13-month 
period during which the witness never met with an instructor 
(T.117); 4) The only reading the witness had done, outside 
from the monthly sheet distributed within his department, was 
from the FBI handbook (T.118); 5) The witness had read "bits and 
pieces" of other books which he could not name (T.118); 6) The 
witness was unable to articulate the name of but one author of 
an article concerning some area of fingerprinting, but was unable 
to say what the article was about and admitted to not having 
read it in its entirety (T.120). 
Concerning the fingerprint evidence offered against the 
Appellant, cross examination further revealed that the witness 
could not testify as to when he compared the latent prints found 
at the Hibler home with a known inked impression of the Appellant 
(T.136); that he could not find his report concerning Appellant's 
case (T.136); Appellant's name was suggested for comparison by 
the investigating detective and did not result from an independent 
classification comparison (T.138); the witness had made no diagram 
depicting the location of the latent prints on the window and had 
no report at trial to rely on for refreshing his memory (T.145); 
although other fingerprint smudges were found suggesting the possi-
bility of other or different prints on the window, no notes were 
made or kept by the witness (T.148); a latent print of a nerson 
other than the Appellant and the Hiblers was found but not comoared 
with any other individuals' known prints (T.155). 
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Despite this testimony, the trial court overruled 
defense counsel's motion objecting to the rendering of a con-
,_lusion by the witness, thereby committing nrejudicial error. 
The issue of qualification has been raised before and in 
each case, where the appellate courts determined to uphold the 
trial court's ruling it was based on qualifications far stronger 
than those of Bell. In Hardison v. State, 437 P.2d 868 (Nev. 1968), 
the court ruled admissible the testimony of an officer after it 
found a background of 6 months formal training on fingerprint 
classification and identification methods, 16 months of in-service 
training, and the lifting of 1,000 latent prints by the time of 
the witness' involvement in the Hardison case. Another Nevada 
case, Collins v. State. 488 P.2d 544 (Nev. 1971), found the 
witness qualified where a home-study course was finished, but 
where there had been a minimum of 24 months in-service training, 
with over 1,000 comparisons made. The issue of completion of the 
FBI training course was addressed in State v. Thomas, 553 P.2d 1357 
(Wash. 1976). This training, when coupled with 9 years exoerience 
as a law enforcement officer with 1 1/2 years in the Identification 
Division and a college degree in law enforcement, was deemed 
sufficient. 
In the case of State v. Watson, 587 P.2d 835 (Idaho 1978), 
the Supreme Court of Idaho was asked to find unqualified a police 
officer with 250 hours of schooling in fingerprint identification 
who had read extensively in the field of fingerprinting and had 
processed 20,000 sets during his career. 
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Although in the cited cases each appellant was unsuccess 
ful in convincing the court of the lack of education and exper-
ience of that witness, the facts addressed by the Idaho Court 
reveal a witness brought into question who was far more qualified 
than Deputy Bell. Appellant argues that Bell is even less educatec 
and under-qualified than the witnesses whose testimonies were 
accepted. 
The California case of People v. Chambers, suora, stands 
for the principle that, despite the general rule, trial courts are 
not bound to accept the testimony of exnert witnesses if the court 
determines they are unqualified. For example, a witness, 
although not a police officer, had a college degree in criminology, 
read books on the subject of fingerprinting, discussed the subject 
with people in the field, and had lifted latent prints and made 
comparisons with known prints. His testimony was stricken as 
incompetent despite the offering party's reliance on such author-
ities as Fricke on California Criminal Evidence, 3d.Ed., 141-3, 
and cases cited therein to the effect that, although a witness 
has not had any personal experience, he may still be qualified to 
testify on a subject which he is shown to be familiar as a result 
of study, reading, and education. 
The above cases are distinquishable and the rulings, 
thereby, inapplicable except as to provide a means by which to 
measure Bell's qualifications. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the trial judge was also the trier of fact, 
the conclusions reached by a witness so inexperience<l, uneducated, 
and unprepared as was Officer Bell, could not have been convincing 
beyond a reasonable doubt and it is only fair to conclude that the 
trial judge, once having made an evidentiary ruling, felt bound by 
that ruling. Prejudicial error was committed requiring that the 
Defendant's convictions be overturned. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED chi' ;;;-
JOIID. C . 1'ELLS 
Attorney nr Defendant/Appellant 
DELIVERED two copies of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84114, this ___L_ day of 1984. 
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